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Summary

In 1948, Ghanaians, led by Chief Nii Kwabena Bonne and the Anti-Inflation Campaign Committee, boycotted European imported goods to protest high prices and the rising cost of living. The boycott forced the closure of many shops and led to negotiations with the Chamber of Commerce, resulting in a reduction of profit margins from 75 to 50 percent. However, the actual price decrease was minimal, and the cost of living remained largely unchanged. The campaign also contributed to the broader movement for Ghanaian independence.

Tactics used

Tactics used

Background

In 1948, Ghana was a British colony where the people had no say in political or economic life. During and after World War II, European trading companies kept prices high on scarce imported goods, making the cost of living nearly unmanageable for Ghanaians. Chief Nii Kwabena Bonne formed the Anti-Inflation Campaign Committee in Accra in 1947 to demand that European firms lower prices, especially on cotton textiles. The campaign’s goal was to reduce the price of imported European goods and lower the cost of living.

What happened

In December 1947, Chief Nii Kwabena Bonne sent a letter to the Accra Chamber of Commerce, giving an ultimatum that if European firms did not lower prices by 24 January 1948, Ghanaians would boycott their goods. [source: nv-database] The letter was directed particularly at the United Africa Company, but the company did not take it seriously and never forwarded it to its London head office. [source: nv-database] When no response came, the boycott began on 26 January 1948, targeting imported European goods such as cotton prints, tinned meat, and flour biscuits, as well as goods from Indian and Lebanese stores. [source: nv-database] The boycott was guided by the slogan ‘We cannot buy; your prices are too high. [source: nv-database] If you don’t cut down your prices then close down your stores; and take away your goods to your own country.’ [source: nv-database] The boycott was very successful, leading to the closure of many shops. On 11 February 1948, the Ghanaian government, which had initially declared it would not interfere, arranged meetings between the Chamber of Commerce and the Anti-Inflation Campaign Committee. [source: nv-database] On 17 February, a crowd demonstrated in front of the magistrate’s court during the trial of a chief charged with imposing fines on non-boycotters. [source: nv-database] On 20 February, an agreement was reached: some foreign firms reduced their overall profit margin from 75 to 50 percent. [source: nv-database] The government announced over the radio that prices on some imported goods would be reduced and the boycott would end on 28 February. [source: nv-database] However, many Ghanaians were disappointed because the reduction referred to profit margins, not prices, so actual prices changed very little and the cost of living remained nearly unchanged. [source: nv-database] [source: nv-database] The campaign became part of the preparation for the 1949-51 independence campaign. On the last day of the boycott, African ex-servicemen began a march to present a petition to the British governor, but were stopped by police, leading to rioting that Nkrumah used to demonstrate readiness for independence. [source: nv-database]

Key people & organizations

  • Chief Nii Kwabena Bonne
  • Anti-Inflation Campaign Committee
  • Chamber of Commerce in Accra
  • United Africa Company
  • chiefs of Manya Krobo
  • chiefs of Suhum
  • chiefs of Akim Oda
  • chiefs of Cape Coast
  • chiefs of Sekondi
  • chiefs of Tarkwa
  • chiefs of Axim

Outcome

Verdict: partial.

The campaign achieved a partial outcome: it forced firms to negotiate and reduce profit margins, but the actual price decrease was negligible, so the main goal of lowering the cost of living was not met. The Anti-Inflation Campaign Committee survived and grew influential, and the boycott spread beyond Accra, but the economic change was minimal. [source: nv-database]

Lessons

  • A consumer boycott can force economic negotiations even when the target initially dismisses the campaign as unserious.
  • Clear communication of demands and an ultimatum can mobilize widespread participation across different communities.
  • Victory in negotiations may be symbolic if the actual terms are misunderstood or fail to deliver the promised change.

Sources

Disclaimer: Included as a teaching example of campaign craft, not as endorsement.

Sources & verification

  • nv-database — grounding: primary — license: link-only
  • Rewritten: 2026-06-25 via worker_casestudies_v2.py

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