lang: en
Summary
In December 1987, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip launched a largely nonviolent uprising against Israeli occupation, using strikes, boycotts, tax refusal, and the creation of alternative institutions. The campaign aimed to end Israeli occupation and achieve Palestinian autonomy. Although it failed to end the occupation, it survived and its organizational structures persisted.
Tactics used
Tactics used
- boycotts and strikes
- nonviolent direct action
- civil-resistance
- coalition building
- distributed organizing
- framing and narrative
- methods-of-nonviolent-action
Background
After Israel’s 1967 victory, the West Bank and Gaza Strip came under military occupation, with restrictions on movement, heavy taxation, and economic dependence on Israel. By the 1980s, high unemployment, a shortage of arable land, and the Israeli ‘iron fist’ policy fueled Palestinian discontent, especially among youth who had known only occupation. The goal was to end Israeli occupation and achieve Palestinian political, economic, and cultural autonomy.
What happened
The intifada was sparked in December 1987 by a car crash at a military checkpoint that killed four Palestinians, leading to rumors of intentional killing and spontaneous youth protests [source: nv-database]. Nonviolent leaders including Mubarak Awad and Feisal Husseini formed the United National Command (UNC), which distributed leaflets instructing residents to boycott Israeli products, resign from government jobs, refuse taxes, and stage merchants’ strikes [source: nv-database]. Popular Committees provided social services like childcare, health care, and education, and the UNC issued a ‘Civil Disobedience Statement’ in May 1988 urging Palestinians to regard local committees as their government [source: nv-database]. Palestinians engaged in creative resistance: setting watches to a different hour, holding illegal classes after school closures, refusing to show ID cards, and collectively farming to reduce economic dependence [source: nv-database]. The Israeli government responded with mass arrests, curfews, blockades, and violence, including Defense Minister Rabin’s call to ‘break the bones’ of protesters [source: nv-database]. Despite international criticism and Israeli peace group support, the US did not condemn Israel, and the campaign’s nonviolent discipline eroded as leaders were jailed and some UNC leaders encouraged rock- and Molotov cocktail-throwing [source: nv-database]. By fall 1988, the PLO took command and the uprising shifted toward armed struggle [source: nv-database].
Key people & organizations
- United National Command for the Escalation of the Uprising in the Occupied Territories (UNC)
- Mubarak Awad
- Feisal Husseini
- Tayseer Arouri
- Popular Committees
- Israeli Women in Black
- Peace Now
- 21st Year
- Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
- Yash Gvul
- Israeli Civil Administration
- Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees
- Union of Women’s Work Committees
Outcome
Verdict: partial.
The campaign did not achieve its primary goal of ending the occupation, but it survived repression and its organizational structures (Popular Committees) remained active. The nonviolent phase was arguably more successful than the later violent phase, but internal violence and the shift to armed struggle undermined its effectiveness. [source: nv-database]
Lessons
- A distributed leadership model can sustain a campaign even when leaders are arrested, as new leaders constantly emerge.
- Building alternative institutions can reduce dependence on the opponent and strengthen community resilience.
- Violence within a largely nonviolent campaign can alienate potential allies and shift media coverage away from the nonviolent message.
Sources
- Global Nonviolent Action Database —
[[nv-database]]
Disclaimer: Included as a teaching example of campaign craft, not as endorsement.
Sources & verification
nv-database— grounding: primary — license: link-only- Rewritten: 2026-06-25 via
worker_casestudies_v2.py