Summary
Daubanes (HEC Lausanne) and Jean-Marie’s A Theory of NGO Activism (MIT CEEPR Working Paper 2016-010) — the most-cited formal economic model of NGO strategy choice, with predictions about when NGOs use information, legal, market, or political strategies. [source: daubanes-ngo-activism]
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Julien Daubanes (HEC Lausanne) and Aude Jean-Marie (University of St Andrews, formerly MIT CEEPR) developed the Theory of NGO Activism in their 2016 paper A Theory of NGO Activism (MIT CEEPR Working Paper 2016-010). The model treats NGOs as rational actors choosing among four campaign strategies — information (public reporting, naming-and-shaming), legal (regulatory complaints, lawsuits), market (consumer boycotts, supply-chain pressure), and political (regulator lobbying, legislative advocacy) — and asks: given the firm’s expected response and the regulator’s posture, which strategy is optimal?
The model’s key insight: NGO choice of strategy depends on three structural factors — the cost of each strategy, the firm’s expected response (reputation-sensitivity), and the regulator’s posture (active vs captured). The model derives predictions: an NGO facing a reputation-sensitive firm and an active regulator will use information strategies (cheap, and the firm folds without further escalation); an NGO facing a reputation-insensitive firm and a captured regulator must escalate to market or political strategies.
The Theory has been extended to include financial-market activism (shareholder proposals, divestment) and the role of coalitions. It is the most-cited formal model of NGO strategy in the 2010s academic literature and is frequently paired with the descriptive frameworks of Keck & Sikkink and Bill Moyer in graduate-level political-economy courses. [source: daubanes-ngo-activism]