Skip to content

Campaigning Wiki

4 min read

lang: en

Summary

Chris Rose and Phil Bennett’s values-based segmentation (CDSM) — a UK psychographic framework that divides the public into three motivational groups (Pioneers, Prospectors, Settlers) and a fourth Hostile group, predicting which messages and tactics will move which segments. Now standard in UK NGO campaigning and increasingly applied in US and EU campaigns.

Body

The values-based segmentation (CDSM — Cultural Dynamics Strategy Model) is a psychographic framework developed by Chris Rose and Phil Bennett at the UK Campaign Strategy consultancy, building on the work of British sociologist Michael Young’s research on the Pioneer-Prospector-Settler typology. The framework was first applied in the late 1990s to UK environmental campaigning and is now the standard segmentation used by major UK NGOs including Greenpeace UK, the National Trust, WWF-UK, and the RSPCA. [source: campaign-strategy-rose]

The framework divides the population into three motivational groups plus a residual:

  • Pioneers (~15-20% of the UK population) — intrinsically motivated, concern-driven, willing to act on their values. The active campaign base. Pioneers respond to urgency, moral framing, and authentic action. They will join, donate, and protest on the strength of the issue alone.
  • Prospectors (~30%) — extrinsically motivated, status-seeking, socially mobile. Prospectors respond to what is gaining traction, what’s fashionable, what signals the right kind of identity. They are the swing segment in most campaigns: campaigns that move Prospectors win; campaigns that don’t, don’t.
  • Settlers (~40%) — tradition-oriented, security-seeking, place-rooted. Settlers respond to stability, community, and concrete local benefit. They are not opposed to the campaign’s goal — they are often supportive in principle — but they distrust rapid change and will be alienated by campaigns that feel chaotic.
  • Hostiles (~15-20%) — alienated from all three values clusters. Hostiles are not reachable on the issue, but they can be neutralised by avoiding campaign tactics that radicalise them (militant direct action, hostile framing). The strategic question for campaigners is not “how do we win the Hostiles over” but “how do we prevent the Hostiles from being a barrier to the Prospectors”.

The framework’s strategic claim: the Pioneer core cannot win a campaign on its own. It has the motivation but typically not the numbers to swing public opinion or shift the policy. The Prospectors are the swing segment — most campaigns are won or lost on whether Prospectors move. The Settlers are an under-tapped base that campaigns often alienate by ignoring.

The framework’s tactical claim: messages and tactics should be tuned to the segment. Pioneer-facing communications can be morally direct, technically detailed, and unflinching about the problem. Prospector-facing communications need to make the campaign look successful, social, and identity-affirming. Settler-facing communications need to be local, concrete, and community-rooted. A campaign that speaks only to Pioneers is speaking to the wrong segment. [source: campaign-strategy-rose]

The framework is most developed in the UK, where the original CDSM dataset is largest, but has been adapted for US, Australian, and EU audiences. Its limit: the segmentation works best where the Pioneer-Prospector-Settler typology maps to a recognisable social structure, which is less true in highly polarised US contexts.

Use it for

Designing a campaign’s message strategy; choosing the right segment to target first; evaluating why a campaign that engaged the activist base isn’t shifting public opinion; and designing tactics that work across the segments rather than just with the base.

Examples

The Brent Spar campaign (1995) — Rose’s own work with Greenpeace — is the canonical application: a Pioneer issue (deep-green opposition to offshore oil storage), reframed as a Prospector issue (a brand-vs-brand contest that Shell could lose), with tactical discipline that kept Settlers from being alienated by the more confrontational elements. The campaign won against Shell in 1995. [source: campaign-strategy-rose]

The UK Climate Coalition and the Stop Climate Chaos coalition have applied values-based segmentation to the UK climate movement since the 2000s, with measurable Prospector-movement effects. The US analogues (Cultural Strategy by Makan, Dovetail, and others) draw on the same framework but adapt the segments for US audiences.

Graph View

Backlinks